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I.
INTRODUCTION
Lenders in the 1990s are increasingly being forced to take notice
of environmental risks in their lending practices in both the United States
and abroad. I Lending risks associated with environmental contamination

*
B.A., 1991, University of Colorado, Boulder; Candidate for Juris Doctor, 1996,
University of Colorado School of Law.
I. See Howard M. Shanker, A Lender's Guide to Environmental Policy Development, 111
BANKING L.J. 540 (1994) (discussing Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act impact on lending policies); see generally Where Bankers Fear to Tread,
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by borrowers include: (1) decreased value of collateral; (2) reduced ability
to pay by borrower, or insolvency due to remediation costs; (3) direct
liability of lender for clean-up costs where lender assumes control over
collateral; (4) subordination of lender's lien2 ; (5) incurred "walk-away"
costs by not foreclosing on contaminated property due to fear of
environmental liability; and (6) tort damages for personal or property
injuries. Thus, where in the past a lender's liability was limited to its
collateral holdings, environmentally conscience legislation has broadened
to reach the "deep pockets" of today's modem lending institutions.4
Environmental legislation has made lender liability risk assessment
a central concern of secured creditors in the United States., In response to
hazardous waste concerns and incidents such as Love Canal in New York
and Times Beach in Missouri,6 the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)7 was enacted in
1980 . The Act authorized the government to clean up hazardous waste
sites when responsible parties failed to act to prevent or remedy hazardous
incidents and to recover the costs from such parties.' Although CERCLA
provides a "safe harbor" exemption for secured creditors, 9 conflicting
court decisions as to the scope of this exemption have opened the door for
remedial liability where contaminated property is held merely as
collateral.o Lending institutions, therefore, are subject to liability where

ECONOMIST, May 21, 1994, at 85 (discussing lending disincentives due to environmental liability
risks).
2. Shanker, supra note 1, at 540.
3. Scott Vaughn, U.N. Environmental Programme, Environment and Trade/Environment
and Economics Unit, Environmental Risk and Commercial Banks: Discussion Paper 7 (August
1994) [hereinafter Discussion Paper].
4.

HELEN D. CHAITMAN, THE LAW OF LENDER LIABILITY 9-2 (1990).

5.

Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at 9.

6.
John C. Cruden, CERCIA Overview, C921 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 391, 393 (1994); see also
Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability ("Supefund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 35 (1982).

7.

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 9601 (1994) [hereinafter CERCLA].
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631 (repealed 1986), 9607(a)(4)(A); United States v. Maryland Bank &
Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986).
9.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994). The provision excludes from the definition of
"owner or operator" such person "who, without participating in the management of a vessel
or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or
facility." Id.
10.

Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see infra part II.A (discussing

judicial interpretation of "safe harbor" provision).
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they are found to be a responsible party under CERCLA's strict liability
standard.'
Thus far, an estimated 5000 - 7000 sites have been identified for
clean-up in the United States under CERCLA, with an additional 20,000
estimated for future remedial action.' 2 Such clean-up costs average thirtyone million dollars per site with aggregate costs estimated at $500 billion.'3
Therefore, the associated lender costs may be substantial for both existing
and future loans. Consequentially, environmental risk assessment has
sufficient
taken prominence in United States lending practices to ensure
4
capital, and to minimize exposure to environmental liability. 1
Similarly, recent trends in the European Community (EC)'5
demonstrate a new impetus to codify a uniform set of environmental
standards which may impact civil liability for lenders. In the spring of
1993, the European Commission 6 introduced its Green Paper on Repairing
Damage to the Environment" (Green Paper). The Green Paper was the
first step in advancing the EC's "Fifth Environmental Action
Programme." 8 The Programme's central is goal the internalization of
external ecological costs in the life cycle of products from their source to

11. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1994); Cruden, supra note 6, at 39495.
12. Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at 6.
13. Id.
14. Shanker, supra note 1.
15. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [EEC Treaty], Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11. The EEC Treaty was modified to create the European Union in 1992 which
includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Treaty on European
Union [Maastricht Treaty], Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247. On January 1, 1995, the E.U.
expanded to include Austria, Finland, and Sweden. European Union: Rocky Transition From
Twelve to Fifteen, EURO. REP., Jan. 6, 1995.
16. The European Commission is one of four primary institutions which governs the EC.
The Commission proposes and administers legislation. The Council of Ministers is the primary
legislative body which consults and approves legislation. The European Parliament is the EC
representative body which consults and amends legislation. The European Court of Justice
interprets enacted legislation. See generally Maastricht Treaty, supra note 15, arts. 137, 157,
189.
17. Communication from the Commission to the Council, Parliament and the Economic
and Social Committee: Green Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage, COM(93)47
[hereinafter Green Paper].
18. A European Community Programme of Policy and Action in Relation to the
Environment and Sustainable Development, 1993 O.J. (C 138) 1 [hereinafter Fifth Programme].
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their disposal.' 9 As a communication paper by the Commission to the
Council of Ministers and Parliament, the Green Paper explores the utility
of civil liability to remedy environmental damage and finance remediation
costs . 0 Like CERCLA, the Green Paper promulgates a strict liability
2
standard to govern environmental damage. '
The Green Paper was in part facilitated by the development of the
Council of Europe's2 Convention on Civil Liability Resulting from
Activities Dangerous to the Environment (Convention).23 The Convention
seeks to ensure adequate compensation for damage to the environment
resulting from dangerous activities. 2' Like CERCLA and the Green Paper,
the Convention advocates a strict liability standard but explicitly adopts a
"polluter pays" principle.Y
With the EC formulating a community
standard for civil liability, both CERCLA and the Convention will impact
any final proposed legislation by the Commission.
This paper is designed to explore the various implications of
national and supranational legislation on lender liability risks. Section
II(A) analyzes the United States CERCLA experience with a specific
emphasis on the judicial treatment of the secured creditor exemption.
Section II(B) examines more closely the regulatory attempts at defining this
exemption and discusses future prospects in Congress. Section III takes a
comparative look at European efforts to define a supranational
environmental standard and contrasts it with the United States' experience.
Finally, Section IV articulates the specific lessons the EU can learn from
CERCLA and proposes general guidelines for a community wide civil
liability regime.

19. See Patrick Thieffry, Environmental Liability in Europe: The European Union's
Projectsand the Convention of the Council of Europe, 28 INT'L L. 1083, 1083-84 n.3 (1994).
20. Green Paper, supra note 17, § 1.0; see also Susan Nolan, Comment, Foreclosing on
Lender Liability: The European Union Launches Environmental, Civil Liability Legislation, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. 257 (1994).

21. Green Paper, supra note 17, § 4.1.2.
22. The Council of Europe should not be confused with any institution of the European
Union. It was created in 1948 to promote political and military integration in Europe. Its
membership includes a total of twenty-one European states many of which are EU Member
States. Nolan, supra note 20, at 259.
23.

Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the

Environment, June 21, 1993, Eur. T.S. 150, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1230 (1993) [hereinafter
Convention].
24. Id. art. 1.
25. Id. pmbl.
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II. CERCLA
A. Judicial Treatment of the Secured CreditorExemption
CERCLA imposes liability on four categories of responsible
parties for costs associated with the release of hazardous substances under
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).2 6 These categories include:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility;
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed of;
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment . . . of hazardous

substances owned or possessed by such person ...
and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment
facilities.

27

The United States is authorized to recover all costs of removal incurred by
the Government, State, or Indian Tribe, all other necessary costs of
response, damages for injuries to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources; and health assessment or study costs. CERCLA does provide
three affirmative defenses for responsible parties where the release was
caused by an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission by a third
party.2 9

Lender liability derives from the "owner and operator" language
of § 9607(a). The operative definitional section of CERCLA that is of
particular importance to lenders is § 9601(20)(A).3 In the case of a

26. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
27.

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

28.

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).

29.

42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).

30. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) provides:
The term owner or operator means

i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such
vessel, ii) in the case of an onshore facility or offshore facility, any person owning or
operating such facility, iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was
conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar

means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned, operated, or
otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand.
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(A).
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facility," CERCLA defines "owner or operator"32 as "any person owning
or operating such facility."33 Congress created a safe harbor exemption for
secured creditors by excluding from the definition any owner or operator
"who, without participating in the management of a vessel or facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the
vessel or facility. '"" A defendant has the burden of establishing an
3
entitlement to this exemption.
However, Congress did not define the key provisions of this
exception including the phrases "participating in management," "indicia of
ownership," and "primarily to protect [a] security interest." Legislative
history indicates that the secured creditor exception was created to protect
mortgage interests under both the state law title and lien theories. 36 The
"indicia of ownership" language was apparently used to incorporate the
title theory into the exemption. Under the common law title theory of
mortgages, a lender is deemed to hold ownership indicia of property
despite a lack of possession because the mortgage conveys actual title to
the land. 37 Conversely, under the lien theory no title is conveyed so no
ownership interest is present for CERCLA purposes.3 8 Thus, the language
choice indicates that "Congress intended to protect banks that hold
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(A)(9) (1994). CERCLA defines "facility" as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline. .

..

well, pit,

pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling
stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not

include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel.
Id.
32. It is important to note that the actual word choice of the definitional section of §
9601(20)(A) is in the disjunctive while the operative language of § 9607(a)(1) is in the
conjunctive. Despite this inconsistent usage, the courts have repeatedly construed the language in
the disjunctive to be in accordance with legislative history and the result of careless drafting.
See, e.g., Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1554 n.3; Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp.
at 577-78.

The House of Representatives has recognized this error and has substituted the

disjunctive form in its reauthorization bill. See THE SUPERFUND REFORM ACT OF 1995, H.R.
DOC. NO. 228, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 403 (1995).

33. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
35.

Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1555; Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at

578.
36. Note, Cleaning up the Debris After Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA 's
Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1249, 1258 (1991); see Peter Lavalette, Note,

The Security Interest Exemption Under CERCLA: Timely Relief from the EPA, 24 U. TOL. L.
REV. 473, 478 (1993).
37.

Lavalette, supra note 36, at 480.

38.

Id.
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mortgages in jurisdictions governed by the common law of mortgages"
under the title theory39 to the same degree as lien mortgage jurisdictions.'Although the indicia of ownership criteria may be sufficiently
broad to reach several theories of ownership, most of the controversy and
uncertainty surrounding the secured creditor exemption derives from the
"participation in management" provision.4 1 Where a lender is deemed to
have acted in a managerial capacity, the lender is not able to use the
exemption.4 2 However, the lack of legislative history relating to this
provision has created difficulties in interpretation and has resulted in
varied judicial standards among the circuits.4 3

In June 1991,

the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) responded by promulgating its
The EPA
proposed rules to clarify the secured lender exception."
specifically noted that the need for the rules was justified by the lack of
uniformity in judicial interpretation and the absence of guidance due to
scant legislative history.'4 After reviewing over 350 comments on the
proposed rules, the EPA released its final version in April of 1992 to
"clarify and specify the range of activities that may be undertaken" by a
secured creditor without losing the protection of the exemption." The final
rules sought to do this by defining the ambiguous key phrases of §
9601(20)(A).' 7 However, on February 4, 1994, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia nullified these rules holding that the
39. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 580.
40. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Lender
Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,444, 18,350-51 (1992) (EPA lender liability rules

providing the definitions of "security interest" and "indicia of ownership" are meant to ensure
secured creditors in both jurisdictions fall within the exemption).
41.

John R. Zebrowski, Ruling Raises Red Flag on Environmental Liability, AM. BANKER,

Apr. 29, 1994, at 20.
42.

42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (1994).

"[Ihe statutory language chosen by Congress

explicitly holds secured creditors liable if they participate in the management of a facility." Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1557.
43.

Compare Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1550

(holding management extends to

capacity to influence treatment of hazardous waste) with United States v. Mirabile, [1985] 15
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,

1985) (limiting the scope of

management to operational activities).
44. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan: Lender Liability
Under CERCLA, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798 (1991) (proposed June 24, 1991).

45. Id. at 28,799.
46. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan: Lender Liability
Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (1992))
[hereinafter EPA Rules]; see also Joseph D. Uradnick, Note, Secured Lender Liability Under
CERCLA, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 109, 110 (1992).
47.

40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c) (1994).
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EPA exceeded its statutory authority. 8 Thus, the prior case law
interpreting the secured creditor exemption is still controlling and a survey
of the conflicting standards is appropriate to gauge the liability risks for
lenders.
The interpretive history of the secured creditor exemption is
essentially defined by two federal district court cases 9 and two circuit court
holdings. ° These decisions have promulgated four basic standards for
judging when a lender's participation in management or ownership causes
the lender to forfeit its exemption. These basic standards are the "day-today" participation standard,' the "vested title" rule,52 the "influence"
standard,53 and the "actual management" standard.5'
In United States v. Mirabile," the United States District Court for
Eastern Pennsylvania held that the foreclosure of a security interest without
active participation in the day-to-day operations of the facility did not
destroy the secured creditor exemption of §9601(A)(20) .16 The case
involved the American Bank & Trust Company (ABT), Mellon Bank
National Association (Mellon), and the Small Business Administration
(SBA), all of whom were financing the operations of a paint manufacturer,
Turco Coatings, Inc. (Turco), when a hazardous waste condition
developed at a Turco the site. 7 The United States sued to recover clean-up
costs associated with the removal of drums of waste from the Mirabiles
who joined the banks as third party defendants. 8
After Turco's petition for bankruptcy reorganization was denied,
ABT foreclosed on the site which it had secured by a mortgage, purchased
it at a sheriff's sale, and assigned its bid to the Mirabiles who were the
existing owners at the time the suit was brought. 9 During the four months

48.

Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1100.

49. Mirabile, [1985] 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,994; MarylandBank & Trust

Co., 632 F. Supp. at 573.
50. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1550; In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th

Cir. 1990).
51.

Mirabile, [1985] 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,994.

52.

Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 573.

53.

Fleet FactorsCorp., 901 F.2d at 1550.

54. Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d at 668.
55.

Mirabile, [1985] 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,994.

56. Id. at 20,996.

57. Id. at 20,995-96.
58. Id. at 20,995.
59. Id. at 20,996.
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before the assignment, ABT protected the property from vandalism,
showed the property to prospective buyers, and inquired about the disposal
of waste drums on the property.60 Mellon held a security interest in the
inventory and assets of Turco which it sold after the failed bankruptcy
petition. 61 In addition to the security interest, a loan officer of Girard
Bank, Mellon's predecessor, served on Turco's advisory board which was
to oversee operations.6 2 SBA was secured by a second mortgage on
Turco's real property and held a second lien in machinery, equipment,
inventory, and accounts receivable. 63 The loan agreement provided for
management assistance by SBA which was never provided. Additionally,
the SBA never held legal title to any of its secured interests although its
loan representatives did visit the facility to oversee the liquidation of
assets."1 All three lenders moved for summary judgment asserting that their
interest and as such were exempt under
control was limited to a financial
65
exemption.
the secured creditor
In considering the lenders motions for summary judgment, the
court interpreted the language of the exemption as "plainly [suggesting]
that provided a secured creditor does not become overly entangled in the
affairs of the actual owner or operator of a facility, the creditor may not be
held liable for clean-up costs."" Such financial involvement differed from
the day-to-day operational aspects of the facility contemplated by the
statute.6 7 In granting summary judgment for ABT and SBA, the court
stated, "[m]ere financial ability to control waste disposal practices of the
sort possessed by the secured creditors in this case is not ... sufficient for
the imposition of liability."" ABT's actions were deemed "prudent and
routine steps" of a secured creditor attempting to protect its investment.6 9
Despite SBA's loan agreement, which contemplated active participation in
management, the court was persuaded by the fact that SBA never held title
However,
to its secured interests and never actually participated.7 0
60. Mirabile, [1985] 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
61. Id.

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.

65. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
66. Mirabile, [1985] 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,995.
67. Id.
68.

Id.

69. Id.at 20,996.
70. Id.at 20,997.
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Mellon's motion for summary judgment was denied because the court
found there was sufficient evidence that Mellon's 7 predecessor was
involved on a day-to-day basis in the operation of Turco. '
In United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.,72 the Federal
District Court of Maryland refused to apply the "day-to-day" standard
analysis where legal title had vested in the secured creditor. Maryland
Bank & Trust (MBT) attempted to apply the broad financial control
standard of Mirabile to a secured lender who had foreclosed on property
and then purchased it at the foreclosure sale, protecting its security interest
in and acquiring legal title to the property. 3 The court explicitly rejected
MBT's argument finding that the "legislative history and policies behind
the Act counsel against such a generous reading of [the secured creditor]
74
exclusion.
In Maryland Bank and Trust Co., MBT had extended credit to
Herschel McLeod, Sr. during the 1970s for his two sanitation businesses,
during which time he permitted the dumping of certain hazardous wastes.7
In 1980 his son, Mark McLeod, purchased the site with the help of MBT's
MBT instituted a
financing, but he soon failed to make payments.
foreclosure sale in 1981 and purchased the site in 1982, taking title to the

property .76
After notification by the State of Maryland, the EPA ordered MBT
to initiate corrective action by October 1983 or it would institute its own
77
removal action with funding it had already received under CERCLA.
MBT refused to comply so the EPA cleaned up the site at a cost of
Subsequently, the EPA demanded
approximately $551,713 .7
reimbursement for the recovery action from MBT and eventually filed suit
79
to recover the costs.

71.

Mirabile, [1985] 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,997.

72. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 573.

73. Id. at 579.
74. Id. at 580 (footnote omitted). The court made this finding with specific reference to
the Mirabile decision distinguishing it on the fact that the property in question had been assigned.
Id.
75.

Id. at 575.

The hazardous wastes included toluene, ethylbenzene, total xylenes, lead,

chromium, mercury, and zinc.
76. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. At 575. MBT remained the record owner
of the site for the duration of the proceedings.
77. Id. Mark McLeod actually notified local officials of the waste dumping on the site in
June, 1983.
78.

Id.

79. Id. at 575-76.
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Interpreting the definition of "owner or operator," 0 the court
recognized Congress' intent to exclude lenders from CERCLA liability
who held title under the title theory of mortgages by the broad "indicia of
ownership" language.,' However, the court declined to find that this
language extended to a lender whose security interest ripened into full
legal title by a foreclosure sale .12 "[MBT] purchased the property at the
foreclosure sale not to protect its security interest, but to protect its
investment. Only during the life of the mortgage did [MBT] hold indicia
of ownership primarily to protect its security interest in the land." 3 The
court further noted that to extend the exemption to the case at bar would
give secured creditors a windfall while burdening the government and
subsequent purchasers with the response costs.' 4
In essence, the defendant's position would convert
CERCLA into an insurance scheme for financial
institutions, protecting them against possible losses due to
the security of loans with polluted properties. Mortgagees,
however, already have the means to protect themselves, by
making prudent loans. Financial institutions are in a
position to investigate and discover potential problems in
their secured properties. For many lending institutions,
such research is routine. CERCLA will not absolve them
from responsibility for their mistakes of judgment. 8
Thus, where a lender is confronted with a defaulting debtor who may be
subject to CERCLA liability, the lender is faced with a dilemma: either
purchase the property to protect its security interest and be subject to
liability while it holds title, or forego its investment and incur a loss on the
loan. 6
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).

81. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 579-80; see discussion supra notes 3639.
82. Id. at 579. "The exemption of subsection (20)(A) covers only those persons who, at
the time of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to protect a then held security interest in the
land. . . .The security interest must exist at the time of the clean-up." Id.; see Guidice v. BFG

Electroplating & Mfg., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562-63 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (secured creditor exemption
did not apply where creditor is record owner of foreclosed property).
83. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 579.
84. Id. at 580; see also Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 563.
85. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 580 (footnotes omitted); see EPA Rules,
supra note 46, at 18,346.
86. Joseph D. Uradnick, Note, Secured Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 27 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 109, 115 (1992); Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1104.
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In United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.," the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the secured creditor
exemption as an issue of first impression at the federal appellate level.' 8
The court explicitly rejected the distinction between per se permissible
participation in the financial management of a facility and impermissible
"day-to-day" participation promulgated by the district court in Mirabile.
The court stated that a standard which permitted financial management
while prohibiting operational management ignored the plain language of
the exemption and rendered it meaningless. 9 It noted that such a
construction was too permissive towards secured creditors and that in
order to achieve the "overwhelming remedial" goal of CERCLA,
"ambiguous statutory terms (such as 'participation in management') should
be construed in favor of liability for the costs incurred by the
government." 91 However, the court did reject the proposition that any
participation in the management was sufficient to bar the application of the
exemption.Y Instead, the court adopted a new standard in which "a
secured creditor may incur § 9607(a)(2) liability, without being an
operator, by participating in the financial management of a facility to a
degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of
hazardous wastes. " 9 Fleet Factors Corporation (Fleet) agreed to advance
funds to Swainsboro Print Works (SPW) in 1976 against the assignment of
SPW's accounts receivable and in exchange for a security interest in
SPW's textile facility and all of its equipment, inventory, and fixtures." In
1981, when SPW's debt to Fleet exceeded the estimated value of SPW's
accounts receivable, Fleet stopped advancing funds to SPW who
subsequently ceased operations and began liquidating its assets. 9 In 1982,
after SPW had been adjudicated bankrupt and a trustee assumed title and
control of the facility, Fleet foreclosed on its security interest in some of
the inventory and equipment. Fleet also contracted with third parties to
auction off the collateral, to remove unsold equipment, and to leave the

87.

Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1550.

88.

Id. at 1556.

89. Id. at 1557-58.
90. Id. at 1557 (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d
1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990)).
91.

Id.

92.

Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1556.

93. Id.at 1557 (footnotes omitted).
94. Id. at 1552.
95.

Id.
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facility "broom clean."
Emanuel County, Georgia acquired title to the
facility in 1987 at a foreclosure sale resulting from SPW's failure to pay
taxes. ' In 1984, the EPA discovered 700 fifty-five gallon drums of toxic
waste and forty-four truckloads of asbestos materials abandoned on the
site. 98 Subsequently, the EPA incurred $400,000 in remediation costs and
brought suit to recover its expenses from SPW's majority stockholders and
Fleet.9
In the lawsuit, the first issue addressed by the circuit court was
whether Fleet was liable under § 9607(a)(1) as an "owner or operator" due
to its participation immediately before Emanuel County took title to the
facility in 1987. Under § 9701(20)(A)(iii), the term "owner or operator"
extends to any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled the
activities of a facility immediately before a unit of state or local
government takes title or control of a facility conveyed by bankruptcy,
foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or any other similar means.' °°
The court held that because the bankrupt estate and trustee were the
previous owners of SPW it would be a torture of the plain statutory
language to impose liability on Fleet.'0 ' The fact that the bankrupt estate or
trustee may not have exercised its control or that Fleet may have engaged
in control several years earlier was unimportant because Fleet had had no
involvement with the facility for three years.,02 Thus, the court upheld the
district court's grant of summary judgment for Fleet.
However, Fleet was less successful on the issue of whether it had
participated in the management of SPW at the time of disposal of the
hazardous substances under § 9607(2).' °3 The court found that Fleet's
financial management was "pervasive, if not complete."'1'
Answering

96. Id. at 1552-53 (the third party contracted to clean the facility left it in December 1983).
97.

Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1553.

98.

Id.

99. Id.
100. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
101. Fleet Factors Corp, 901 F.2d at 1555. The court ruled that the "immediately
beforehand" language of § 9601(20)(A)(iii) meant without intervening ownership, operation, or
control thus Fleet was not liable because it did not own, operate or control SPW. Id.
102. Id.
103.

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

104. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1559. Fleet had required its approval before
shipping, established pricing, dictated when and to whom goods were shipped, determined when
employees should be laid off, supervised the office administrator's activities at the site, processed
employee tax forms, controlled access to the facility, and contracted for the disposal of its
equipment. Id.
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Fleet's contention that it was merely acting to protect its security interest
through finar.cial management, the court stated that the scope of the
secured creditor exemption was determined by the nature and extent of the
-reditor's involvement with the facility, not the creditor's motive. 0 A
lender's capacity to influence a debtor facility's handling of hazardous
waste is to be inferred from the extent of its involvement in the facility's
general management which includes financial management. °'6 Thus, the
"influence" standard promulgated by the court's interpretation of §
9607(20)(A) narrowed the application of the exemption, thereby subjecting
lenders to CERCLA liability even where there was no active participation
in management or decisions relating to hazardous waste.'07
In dicta, the court defended its interpretation to challenges that it
would lead to disincentives for lenders to extend credit to businesses with
potential hazardous waste problems, encourage hands-off management
policies, and ultimately result in the perpetuation of hazardous waste
treatment problems.'°0 The court essentially argued that the "influence"
standard would improve hazardous waste handling through the
internalization of hazardous waste costs in loan agreements and through
increased policing by the financial community. Thus, creditors would
incur no greater risks than those they bargained for and would monitor and
insist on environmental compliance by borrowers.'°0 Any increased costs
that are borne by innocent borrowers due to a restrictive credit market are
consistent with the general effect of cost-spreading throughout the
hazardous waste industry."' 0 Furthermore, the court insisted that nothing in
its discussion prohibits a lender from monitoring any aspect of a debtor's
business, or becoming involved in "occasional and discrete financial
decisions relating to the protection of its security interest without incurring
liability. '"" ' The Fleet Factors court buttressed its position by quoting
Maryland Bank's dicta asserting that CERCLA was not meant to be an
105. Id. at 1560; see Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 672 n.2; EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,354.
106. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1559 n.13.
107. Id. at 1558. "Rather a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the
management of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect

hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose." Id.
108. Id.
109.

Id.; see also Howard M. Shanker, A Lender's Guide to Environmental Policy

Development, 111 BANKING L.J. 540 (1994) (discussing generally green conscious loan policies
to reduce environmental liability).
110. Fleet FactorsCorp., 901 F.2d at 1559 (quoting Scott Wilsdon, Note, When a Security
Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J.

1261, 1294 (1987)).
111. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1558.
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insurance scheme for lenders who had the ability to protect themselves
through prudent loans." 2 Nevertheless, the Fleet Factorsdecision has been
the subject of great criticism by the financial community and is regarded as
a shocking, or bombshell opinion. 3
In the second of the major circuit court holdings, In re Bergsoe
Metal Corp.,"4 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit qualified the
Fleet Factors interpretation holding that "whatever the precise parameters
of 'participation,' there must be some actual management of the facility
before a secured creditor will fall outside the exception.""'
Bergsoe
emphasized that as a threshold matter, a creditor must exercise actual
management authority before it can be held liable because the CERCLA
16
exemption uses the active language "participating in management." 1
Where a secured creditor has some input in the planning stages of a loan,
or has rights under the terms of the loan agreement, such activity is
insufficient to warrant liability because the focus is not on the motive or
rights of the lender, but on its actions.1"7 Thus, merely having the power to
get involved in management but not exercising it is insufficient to bar
application of the exemption."' Since the lender never took an active role
in any management whatsoever, the court avoided drawing a distinction
for purposes of its "actual management" threshold between permissible
financial management and day-to-day management."19
The Bergsoe decision created an interpretive fissure for the
secured creditor exception.
Several courts and commentators had
interpreted Fleet Factors as standing for the proposition the "mere capacity
to influence" hazardous waste decisions was sufficient to bar application of
the exception even without any actual management, financial or
otherwise.'20 Therefore, Fleet Factors was widely read as a repudiation of
112. Id.at 1559.
113. See David R. Berz & Peter M. Gillan, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: In Search of
a New Deep Pocket, 108 BANKING L.J. 4, 5-6 (1991); see also G. Van Velsor Wolf, Jr., Lender
Environmental Liability Under the FederalSuperfund Program, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 531 (1991).
114. Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 668.
115. Id.at 672.
116. Id.at 672, 673.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 673 n.3.
119. Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 672.

"We leave for another day the establishment of a Ninth

Circuit rule on this difficult issue ... of [a] 'participation' [in management standard.]" Id.
120. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d
1364, 1369 (9th Cir. 1994); see Shanker, supra note 1, at 541; EPA Rules, supra note 46, at
18,369.
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the Eleventh Circuit management standard. However, this interpretation is
too broad.
As mentioned above, Bergsoe explicitly rejected this
interpretation, reading Fleet Factors as requiring a creditor to exercise
actual management authority to incur liability.' The Ninth Circuit Court
was simply clarifying a threshold requirement set forth by the Fleet
Factors decision without deciding the scope or application of the "capacity
to influence" standard. Similarly, the EPA recognized the need for some
active participation when it promulgated its CERCLA lender liability
22
rules.
A related point of confusion stems from Fleet Factors' distinction
between the phrase "participation in management" in the exemption, and
the term "operator" for CERCLA liability. Although similar, the court
stated in dicta that the two terms or phrases were not congruent such that a
lender could be liable under § 9707(a)(2), "without being an operator, by
participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree
indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous
wastes.' ' 3 Thus, a lender could be liable both as an operator and,
alternatively, as a secured creditor who participates in management of a
facility.124 Since the "participation in management" phrase pertains only to
the application of the exemption, the court's imposition of liability on a
participation basis alone arguably goes well beyond the definition of
"owner or operator" in § 9601(20)(A). A lender would have to qualify as
an "owner or operator" before the exemption would have any use because
otherwise such a lender would not be liable under § 9607(a)(1) or (a)(2) in
the first instance. '5 Nevertheless, the court interpreted the exemption
independently, finding a basis for liability by participation in management
alone under its broad "influence" standard.1'2 As a result, the court did not

121.

Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 673 n.3. "As did the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors, we hold

that a creditor must, as a threshold matter, exercise actual management authority before it can be
held liable for action or inaction which results in the discharge of hazardous wastes."
122.

Id.

EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,345. The l1th Circuit did not hold that the mere

capacity to influence operations, without more, was a sufficient basis on which to impose liability
on a holder. The Fleet Factors court stated that a holder could lose the exemption if it was
actually involved in the management of a secured facility. Id. at 18,369.
123.

Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1557 (footnote omitted).

124. Id. at 1556 n.6 (defining two bases for liability for a secured lender).
125.
498 U.S.
as holder
owner or
Rules, 40

United States v. Kaiser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
1084 (1991) (mistakenly read Fleet Factors to hold Fleet liable as operator rather than
of security interest who participated in management). The E.P.A. recognized the
operator prerequisite for CERCLA liability and the use of the exemption. See EPA
C.F.R. § 300.1100(d)(3) (1992).

126. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1557-58.
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define the scope of the "operator" language, but cited with approval a
decision of a First Circuit District Court. 127 Ironically, the court later
defined the scope of the "operator" language as requiring a person to play
an active role in the actual management or supervision of the day-to-day
activities of a facility.121 Joining a majority of jurisdictions, it held that a
parent corporation could only be liable under CERCLA when its actual
29
and pervasive control extends to the daily operations of its subsidiary.'
Hence, the Eleventh Circuit appears to have inconsistently adopted a more
lenient day-to-day management standard for operators than that which it
explicitly rejected for secured creditors under the same definitional section.
Again, the Bergsoe court side-stepped this issue by finding that the actual
participation threshold had not been crossed by the secured lender.
B. EPA FinalRules
In order to quell the uncertainty in the financial community
generated by the ambiguous judicial standards and scant legislative
guidance,'30 the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated its final
rules "to clarify and specify the range of activities" which a secured lender
may undertake to protect a security interest without exposing itself to
CERCLA liability."' The rules were further necessitated by the increased
confusion generated by the Fleet Factors decision and the increasing role
of the federal government as a secured creditor after taking over failed
savings and loans. 312 The EPA sought to do this by specifically defining
the key provisions of the secured creditor exemption:' 3 (1) "indicia of
ownership," (2) "primarily to protect a security interest," and (3)
"participating in management of a vessel or facility."'11
1. Indicia of Ownership
The "indicia of ownership" language as defined by the EPA is
broadly defined as "evidence of a security interest, evidence of an interest
in a security interest, or evidence of an interest in real or personal property
securing a loan or other obligation, including any legal or equitable title to
127. Id. at 1558 (citing Kayser-Roth Corp., 724 F. Supp. at 20-21).
128. Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1993).
129. Id.
130.

EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,344-45; Uradnick, supra note 86, at 124.

131.

Id. at 18,344.

132. Id. at 18,345; see also Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1104.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
134. EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,346.
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real or personal property acquired incident to foreclosure and its
equivalent."'- A noninclusive list of such evidence is enumerated in the
final rule.'36 A holder of a security interest is defined broadly as a person
who maintains indicia of ownership to protect that interest including the
initial holder, any subsequent holder, a guarantor, or a receiver or similar
person who acts on behalf of or for the benefit of a holder."
Furthermore, a person does not have to hold title or a security interest to
satisfy the definition.1 8 However, the definition does implicitly limit
ownership interests which are associated with debt as opposed to
39
investment interests.

2. Primarily to Protect a Security Interest
In a similarly expansive if not tautological fashion, primarily to
protect a security interest "means that the holder's indicia of ownership are
held primarily for the purposes of securing payment or performance of an
obligation." '4 A security interest is defined as "an interest in a vessel or
facility created or established for the purpose[s] of securing a loan or other
obligation" which includes mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, titles from
lease financing transactions as well as a variety of sales transactions,
factoring assignments, accounts receivable, financing arrangement, and
consignments if established to secure a loan or obligation"."' The
definition explicitly excludes indicia held for investment purposes or any
indicia not held primarily to protect a security interest.12
3. Participation in Management
The construction of the "participation in management" language is
at the heart of the EPA's rules which seek to "protect 'lenders from being
exposed to CERCLA liability for engaging in their normal course of

135. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(a).
136. Id. For example, the list included mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, surety bonds, and
guarantees of obligations, title held pursuant to a lease financing transaction, title assumed by
foreclosure, and their equivalents.
137. Id. § 300.1100(a)(1).
138. Id. § 300.1100(a).

139. Bruce P. Howard & Melissa K. Gerard, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Sorting
Out the Mixed Signals, 64 S.CAL. L. REV. 1187, 1205 (1991).
140. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(b).
141. Id. § 300.1100(b)(1)
142. Id. § 300.1100(b)(2); see EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,374 (quoting Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 573).
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business."" 3 The initially proposed version created a two part general test
which was largely retained in the final rules. In the first prong, a holder
was considered as participating in management if, while the borrower is
still in possession, the holder exercises "decision making control over the
borrower's environmental compliance, such that the security holder has
undertaken responsibility for the borrower's waste disposal or hazardous
substance handling practices which results in a release or threatened
release."'" In the final rules, the EPA removed the proviso which had
required an actual or threatened release so as to clarify that "whether or
not a holder is participating in a facility's management is not dependent on
any specific environmental outcome." "
With respect to the second prong under the proposed version, a
secured creditor fell outside the exemption if it exercised control at the
management level "encompassing the day-to-day environmental
compliance decision making of the enterprise." 146
However, this
terminology was highly criticized as being "awkwardly phrased and poorly
defined" because it did not "clearly distinguish between protected and
impermissible activities. "'"4 Additionally, commentators expressed
concerns that holders could "artfully carve out environmental matters" to
allow the holder to otherwise operate and manage a facility without being
exposed to liability.14 8 The final rules were revised to address these
concerns, stipulating that a holder participates in management "when it
assumes or manifests responsibility for the overall management of the
enterprise encompassing the day-to-day decision making over either the
enterprise's environmental compliance or all, or substantially all, of the
operational aspects of the enterprise other than environmental
compliance."' 4 9 Consistent with prior court decisions, participation in
management does not include the unexercised right to become involved in
a facility's operational decision making.'" The rules enumerate specific

143.
1556).

EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,359 (quoting Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at

144. 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,809 (1991) (proposed June 24, 1991).
145.

EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,359; 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1)(i).

146. Id. at 18,359.
147.

Id. at 18,358.

148. Id. at 18,360.
149. Id. at 18,360; 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1)(ii)(A), (B).
150.

EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,379.
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activities which do not qualify as participating in management including
pre-loan, policing, and workout activities.''
The EPA, however, went one step further by explicitly overruling
Fleet Factors despite its denial to the contrary. 5 2 The final rules mandate
that participation in management means "actual participation in the
management or operational affairs . . . and does not include the mere
capacity to influence, or ability to influence."' 53 Furthermore, under the
second prong of the general test, "financial or administrative" management
is excluded from the scope of the operational aspects of an enterprisel'. In
its accompanying comments, the EPA outlined its standard plainly:
Furthermore, the Agency believes that the general test
should also reflect the distinction between the control
exercised by a person who is exercising decision making
authority over the operational aspects of the facility, and
the influence that may be exerted (no matter how great)
over the borrower by a person who is not part of the
facility's decision making hierarchy. In the first instance,
a person who is functioning in the capacity of a facility
manger is "participating in management" under this final
rule. In the latter case, a person who exerts influence over
such a facility manager but who has no power to direct or
implement operational decisions is not "participating in
management," even if the level of influence exerted over
the borrower is substantial . . . Accordingly, it is only
where the holder actually exercises decision making
control over the facility's operation from within the
facility's hierarchy . . . does the holder "participate in
management. " 5

151.

40 C.F.R.

§ 300.1100(c)(2).

152. The EPA asserts that its rules conform to current judicial decision and specifically
Fleet Factors. It correctly understood the Fleet Factors decision to require a degree of actual

management, as clarified in Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 673 n.3, but erroneously narrowed the
application of the court's language to operational management claiming it was consistent with the
decision. EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,369.
153.

40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1).

154.

Id. § 300.1100(c)(1)(ii)(B).

"Financial or administrative activities include functions

such as that of credit manager, accounts payable/receivable manager, personnel manager,
controller, chief financial officer, or similar function." Id.
155.

EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,359.
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Such language is extremely hard to reconcile with Fleet Factors.156 As
noted above, the court distinctly rejected the distinction between
permissible participation in the financial management of a facility and
impermissible participation in day-to-day or operational management.' 7
Additionally, the court unambiguously stated that a secured creditor could
incur CERCLA liability for participation in financial management
sufficient to influence hazardous waste decisions.5 8 Nevertheless, the EPA
rules do harmonize the standards applied to lenders and parent-subsidiary
relationships, lending themselves to a greater degree of certainty and
predictability.
The EPA rules also deviate from common law norms with respect
to the vesting of title at foreclosure. Provided that a lender does not
participate in management, or fail to, in good faith, dispose or liquidate its
security interest, the final rules allow a lender to foreclose on a security
interest and obtain equitable or legal title.'19 The rules specify an array of
conditions outlining a secured creditor's obligation to sell, release, or
"otherwise divest itself of the property in a reasonably expeditious manner,
using whatever commercially reasonable means are relevant or
appropriate." '6 The Agency considered the act of foreclosure and postforeclosure activities to be "necessary incidents to holding ownership
indicia primarily to protect a security interest."6 ' As such, taking title to
foreclosed property does not void a secured creditor's indicia of ownership
and, therefore, the exemption.
This conclusion is quite contrary to the reasoning and holding of
Maryland Bank & Trust.'62 As discussed above, the court held that
Congress did not intend to extend protection to mortgagees who take title
to property through a purchase at a foreclosure sale because the purchase
63
is designed to protect the lender's investment, not its security interest.
Under an alternative construction, the mortgagee-turned-owner would
derive a windfall from interim government clean-up activities and
increased property value, essentially turning CERCLA into "an insurance
scheme for financial institutions, protecting them against possible losses

156

Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1556.

157. Id.
158.

Id. at 1557, 1559.

159.

40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(d).

160. Id.
161.

EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,377.

162. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 573.
163.

Id. at 579-80; see also Guidice, 733 F. Supp. at 562-63.
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due to the security of loans with polluted properties."'" However, the
EPA recognized that CERCLA should not be used as a loan guarantee for
lending institutions, but disagreed with this interpretation, and argued that
Maryland Bank & Trust held simply that "a foreclosing holder could lose
the exemption by holding onto the foreclosed-on property for an extended
period of time without making any attempt to promptly sell it. "16 With
respect to windfalls received by secured lenders, the EPA insisted that any
surplus value would ordinarily be returned to the debtor from whom the
EPA would "seek to recover any amount by which a person is unjustly
enriched by a taxpayer-financed clean-up [sic]. "'6
Responses to the EPA's rules were mixed. Although the lending
community approved the clarification and protection from CERCLA
liability, it sought more permanent protection in the nature of legislative
reform.16, At the same time, the environmental groups complained that the
rule expanded the exemption, provided lenders with foreclosure and postforeclosure immunity, and unfairly placed the burden of proof on plaintiffs
where the exemption was invoked.1'6 Other commentators questioned the
authority of the EPA to create its own substantive liability rules under
CERCLA and its possible bias in doing so. 1 69 Still others responded that
the EPA action provided a- remarkable opportunity to create predictability
in CERCLA's liability scheme and was clearly within its authority. 0
Questions regarding the legal validity of the rules and their continued
application were settled by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia on February 4, 1994.
4. Current Status of EPA Final Rules on Lender Liability
In Kelley v. EPA, the State of Michigan brought suit to challenge
the EPA's final rules and asserted that the EPA lacked statutory authority
to restrict private rights of action pertaining to liability under §§9607,

164.

Maryland Bank & Trust Co., at 580; see supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.

165.

EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,361.

166. Id. (quoting Proposed Rules, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798, 28,806).

167. Uradnick, supra note 86, at 132 (citing Environmental Protection Agency, 4 Inside
EPA's Superfund Report, No. 17, Aug. 15, 1990); Lavalette, supra note 36, at 508; Marianne
Lavelle, Both Sides Oppose Rule That Limits Liability of Lenders, NAT'L L.J., May 11, 1992, at
19.
168. Uradnick, supra note 86, at 133 (citing Comments of EPA's ProposedLender Liability
Rule, 22 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 17, 1159 (Aug. 23, 1992)).
169. Craig Johnston, Who Decides Who's Liable Under CERCL4?:
EPA Slips a
Bombshell into the CERCL4 Reauthorization Process, 24 ENVTL. L. 1045, 1048-49 (1994).
170.

Lavalette, supra note 36, at 508.
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9601(20)(A)."' The EPA first claimed it had authority to promulgate
legislative or substantive rules pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act." 2 However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed
with Michigan holding that the EPA failed to demonstrate any explicit or
implicit evidence of congressional intent to delegate interpretive
authority.'73 Allowing the EPA to determine the scope of liability was
tantamount to allowing a civil prosecutor to make the same
determination. 4 Accordingly, the court held that "it cannot be argued that
Congress intended EPA, one of many potential plaintiffs, to have authority
to, by regulation, define liability for a class of potential defendants. ""
The court further declined to sustain the EPA's argument that the
rule should be upheld as being interpretive,1 6 demanding deference under
the Chevron test." Under Chevron, where an interpretive rule is based on

specific statutory provisions and reflects an administrative agency's
construction of the statute, its construction is entitled to substantial judicial
deference." 8 However, like the substantive rule argument, a precondition
to the application of the Chevron test and its corresponding judicial
' 9
deference is "a congressional delegation of administrative authority. "1
Consequently, the EPA's interpretive argument failed for the same reason
as its substantive one-lack of congressional authority. The court
summarized that "[W]here Congress does not give an agency authority to
determine (usually formally) the interpretation of a statute in the first
instance and instead gives the agency authority only to bring the question
171.

Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1100.

172.

EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,368; Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1104.

173. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1105 (citing Linemaster Switch Corp. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 1299,
1303 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).

174. Id. at 1106 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)); see Wagner
Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1584 (1992); see
also Johnston, supra note 169, at 1047-48. "It is one thing for Congress to agree that the issue of

lender liability under CERCLA needs further resolution, or even to agree with the EPA's
proposed regulation. It is quite another for Congress to give EPA carte blanche authority to
interpret CERCLA's entire liability scheme."
175.

Id.

Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1107 (no authority found in language of § 105 or § 106).

176. EPA Rules, supra note 46, at 18,344; Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1108.

177. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837.
(1984). Chevron utilizes a two part test: (1) where statute is unambiguous, agency must fulfill
Congressional intent, and (2) where ambiguous, agency interpretation must be based on

permissible construction of the statute using traditional tools of statutory interpretation. Id. at
843. Furthermore, any such construction must not be arbitrary, capricious, manifestly contrary
to the statute, or unreasonable. Id. at 844.
178. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1108 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43).
179. Id. (quoting Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990)).
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to a federal court as the 'prosecutor,' deference to the agency's
interpretation is inappropriate. "'0
In the court's parting words, it noted that the EPA, before it
promulgated its rules, had sought congressional relief to clarify the rules
and had been rebuffed; therefore, it ought to try again."' Following the
Kelley decision in 1994, this is exactly what the EPA and the lending
community has done. The Superfund Reauthorization Act of 1994 was
introduced into both the Senate and House of Representatives which
expressly provided the authority of the EPA to create substantive rules
regarding lender liability, thereby solving the threshold problem in
Kelley."2 The bill failed after clearing five congressional committees when
Republicans refused to vote separately on provisions of the legislation
unrelated to lender liability. 83' This is not to say that the issue is dead.
Two new bills were introduced in the House in early 1995 with the
incoming Republican Congress. Republican Representative Fred Upton of
Michigan introduced the Lender and Judiciary Fairness in Liability Act of
1995 on January 4, 1995, which seeks to amend CERCLA with language
identical to that of the final rules."14 Similar to the 1994 legislative
package, the Superfund Reform Act of 1995 amends §9615 to give the
executive explicit authority to enact the lender liability rules of the EPA.' 8
At the time of writing, neither bill had reached the congressional floor and
However, given the outcry for
was still tied up in committee.
congressional clarification of CERCLA's liability scheme and current
rethinking of environmental protection by the conservative Congress, the
likelihood of passage of one or both of these bills is quite high. Both bills
appear to be gaining widespread and bipartisan support. Consequently, the
EPA lender liability rules would be reinstated overruling Kelley.

180. Id. (citing United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
The court's position is support by legislative history which supports the interpretation that
Congress intended the courts to determine liability issues. See Johnston, supra note 169, at 1049
(citing 126 CONG. REC. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph)); H.R.
REP. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856.
181. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1109 (referring to the failed CERCLA amendments in H.R. 4494,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); 136 CONG. REC. H1505 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990)).
182. See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 17, 1994), 140 CONG.
REC. S13,852 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1994); H.R. DOC. No. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
183. Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Lender Liability Remains Gray Area as Lawmakers Hold
Off on Superfund, AM. BANKER, Oct. 12, 1994, at 3.
184. LENDER AND JUDICIARY FAIRNESS IN LIABILITY ACT OF 1995, H.R. Doc. No. 200,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), 141 CONG. REC. H169 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995).
185. SUPERFUND REFORM ACT OF 1995, H.R. DoC. No. 228, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995), 141 CONG. REC. H228 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995).
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EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM EC DRAFT

A. Directive on Civil Liabilityfor Damage Caused by Waste
Under the Fifth Environmental Action programme, an important
objective of the EC is to establish an "integrated Community (Union)
approach to environmental liability. 116 In furtherance of this objective, the
European Commission issued its draft proposal for a Directive on Civil
Liability for Damage Caused by Waste which sought to harmonize the
laws of the Member States for environmental harm caused by waste.'
The Directive holds producers'
of waste civilly liable for
environmental degradation and harm regardless of fault1 9 where such

producers have "actual control" of the waste at the time of the incident
causing harm.'9 Since the Directive did not specifically define "actual
control," an expansive interpretation of the language would likely extend
liability to secured creditors.19'
Unlike CERCLA, the Directive
specifically provides for joint and several liability'9 subject to the defenses
of contributory negligence. 93 The liability for harm extends to bodily

injury, damage to property, and environmental harm.'9 However, liability
for remediation costs for environmental harm are limited to the costs
which do not substantially exceed the benefits of full restoration.' 95

186. Fifth Programme, supra note 18; Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at 8.
187. Proposal for a Council Directive on Civil Liability for Damages Caused by Waste, 32
O.J. (C 251) 3 (1989), COM(89)282 final [hereinafter Directive], modified by Amended Proposal
for a Council Directive, COM(91)219 final [hereinafter Modified Directive]; see Patrick
Thieffry & Peter Nahmias, The European Community's Regulation and Control of Waste and the
Adoption of Civil Liability, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 949 (1991).
188. A producer is defined as any person "whose occupational activities produce waste
and/or anyone who carries out pre-processing, mixing or other operations resulting in a change in
the nature and composition of this waste, until the moment when the damage or injury to [the]
environment is caused." Directive, supra note 187, art. 2, para. 1(a).
189. Id. art. 3.1.
190. Susan Nolan, Comment, Foreclosing On Lender Liability: The European Union
Launches Environmental, Civil Liability Legislation, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. 257 (1994).
191.

Id.

192. Directive, supra note 187, art. 5.
193. Id. art. 7, para. 2. Like CERCLA, the modified directive allowed force majeure as
an affirmative defense. Modified Directive, supra note 187, art. 6. 1.b.
194. Directive, supra note 187, art. 2, para. 1(c), (d).
195. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
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Efforts to enact the Directive have largely been frustrated by
legislative difficulties."' Due to the recent promulgation of the Green
Paper, the likelihood that the Directive will be adopted or ever have
binding force within the EC is negligible at best. Nevertheless, it
represents the first attempt at the European approach of remedying
environmental harm through the operation of civil liability.
B. Council of Europe's Draft Convention on Civil Liability
On June 21, 1993, the Council of Europe adopted its own
approach to a civil liability regime with the passage of the Convention on
Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment. 97 By adopting a "polluter pays" principle,19 the stated
purpose of the Convention is to ensure "adequate compensation for
damage resulting from activities dangerous to the environment and also [to
To effectuate its
provide] for means of prevention and reinstatement."'1
goal, the Convention holds operators of dangerous activities liable for the
damage caused by such activities to the extent they exercise control over
the activities.2 ° In broad language, environmentally dangerous activities
include the production, handling, storage, use, or discharge of dangerous
substances which have properties which "constitute a significant risk for
man, the environment, or property."201 Similarly, the Convention defines
the key terms such as "environment" and "incident" expansively in a
To provide a source of
manner that is reminiscent of CERCLA.compensation, the Convention mandates that operators of dangerous
activities be required to participate in a "financial security scheme" or
maintain a financial guarantee up to a certain limit.203
The Convention does provide certain limitations and exemptions to
its liability scheme. Although implicitly premised on a strict liability
196. Thieffry, supra note 19, at 1084.
197. Convention, supra note 23.
198. Id. pmbl.

199. Id. art. 1.
200. Id. arts. 2, 6.

201. Id. arts. 2(1), 2(2). The Convention lists a gamut of characteristics similar to those
used to identify hazardous wastes in CERCLA such as explosive, oxidizing, flammable, toxic,
corrosive, and carcinogenic. Convention, supra note 23.
202. The "environment" includes general categories of natural resources both abiotic and

biotic. Id. art. 2(10). "Incident" extends to any occurrence or series of occurrences which
actually cause damage or create a grave or imminent threat of causing damage. Id. art. 2(11)
(emphasis added).
203.

Id. art. 12.
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standard, the convention provides that an operator is to be held liable for
damages caused by activity over which it was exercising control. Where
an incident consists of a continuous occurrence involving several
operators, all operators are jointly and severally liable, but an individual
operator is only liable to the extent that his exercise of control contributed
to only part of the damage, provided he can prove the limitation.1
Exemptions exist for incidents caused by force majeure, third parties, and
actions compelled by the state. 5 Similar to the Directive, under the
Convention's statute of limitations, an action must be brought within three
years from the date on which the claimant knew or reasonably should have
known of the damage, and under no circumstances can an action be
brought after thirty years from the date of the incident causing the
damage.
The Convention has been subject to a wide degree of criticism.
The European Commission has criticized the Convention for failing to
outline provisions to protect competition within the European Union.
Other commentators have complained that the strict liability and fault
based liability provisions are unclear and give too much power to nongovernmental organizations by giving them legal status to sue.M
At
present, only eight of the Council States have signed2 and Denmark and
20
the United Kingdom have stated that they will not support it.
Nevertheless, the Commission proposed in its Green Paper joining the
Convention as a starting point to create an EU strict liability regime for
21
remedying environmental damage".

204.

Id. art. 6(2).

205.

Convention, supra note 23, art 8. A contracting state may also create a "state of the

art" exemption by reservation excluding liability where the state of knowledge at the time of the

incident was scientifically insufficient to reasonably assess the probable harm. Id. art. 35(1)(b).
206. d. art. 17. The Convention adds an additional qualifier to the statute of limitations
requiring the identity of the operator to be known or reasonably to have been known. Id. art.
17(1).
207. Nolan, supra note 20 (citing Environment, EC Commentaries (Coopers & Lybrand),
Mar. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurscp. File).

208. Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at 9.
209. Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Finland, and The
Netherlands signed the Convention upon it passage in 1993. Chris Clarke, EU: Green
Mountain-EnvironmentalLiability, CORP. COVER, Feb. 1, 1994.
210.

Environment: The Council of Europe Convention on Environmental Liability, EC

Commentaries (Coopers & Lybrand), Oct. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Eurscp.
File.
211.

Green Paper, supra note 17, § 4.1.2.
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C. Green Paperon Remedying Environmental Damage
Spurred by the efforts of the Council of Europe and several major
environmental accidents,22 the European Commission launched its Green
Paper on Remedying Environmental Damage in 1993 to initiate
community-wide discussion on the "usefulness of civil liability as a means
of allocating responsibility for the costs of environmental restoration" and
to investigate the use of a joint compensation scheme where civil liability
fails. 21'

The Green Paper does not propose any specific provisions for

future EU legislation but rather explores alternatives and perspectives to be
considered and commented on by Member States, industry, and European
institutions. The underlying principle of the discussion did focus on the
use of civil liability as "a legal and financial tool used to make those
responsible for causing damage pay compensation for the cost of
remedying that damage. "214
However, the Green Paper reveals some strong preferences the
Commission has towards establishing a civil liability scheme in Europe.
The Commission discussed the attributes of both a fault and strict liability
based system showing a strong preference for a strict liability standard.' '
Strict liability provided for better risk management and legal certainty,
facilitated more effectively by the "polluter pays" principle while assures
that costs of damage caused by an economic activity are borne by the
operator. Strict liability was a proven and recognized standard both in
Europe and abroad for enforcing compliance with environmental laws .116
Conversely, the fault based approach was not favored due to its onerous
burdens of proof and the difficulty associated with judging whether an
operator acted wrongfully. 2 ,

The Commission had related concerns

regarding the availability of insurance and the costs associated with
mandatory insurance requirements where liability cannot be easily
8
assessed.2 '

212.

However, citing the experience of the United States with

The Green Paper cited the Sandoz incident as an example.

Green Paper, supra note

17, § 1. The Sandoz incident involved 1986 warehouse fire at a Swiss chemical manufacturing
plant which resulted in a massive release of chemicals into the Rhine river. Economist
Intelligence Unit, Environmental Liability: European Community Threat of US Legislation, BUS.
EUR., Sept. 12, 1994.

213.

Green Paper, supra note 17, § 1.

214. Id.

215. Id. § 4.1.2; seeThieffry, supra note 19, at 1085.
216. Green Paper, supra note 17, §§ 4.1.1- 4.21.
217. Id. § 4.1.1.

218. Id. § 2.1.11. The Commission also noted the insurance deficiencies and problems
created as result of the CERCLA liability
scheme. Id.
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CERCLA, the Commission noted that an extensive strict liability regime
can overburden certain sectors leading to further disruption of the
economy."29
In order to augment the shortcomings of a strict liability regime,
the Green Paper discusses the utility of a "joint compensation system"
similar to CERCLA. °
Such a system would be maintained by
contributions from the economic sectors most closely associated with the
environmental harm, preserving the "polluter pays" principle. The key
advantages to such a fund are reduced response time for emergency and
remedial action, cost spreading through the principle of shared
responsibility, and full recovery of costs for failed recovery under the civil
liability scheme due to bankruptcy or unidentified operators. 1 In response
to this proposal, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC)2 22 only
supported the idea of a fund as a back up measure, provided the funds
could be effectively used to respond to emergencies, that partial payment
will be accepted until liability issues are resolved, and that there will be
231
compensation for injured parties where full costs cannot be. recovered.
However, the ESC believed that no collective fund could replace any
preferred civil liability scheme. This scheme was not favored in general
because of its ability to weaken the concept of individual liability and act
22 4
as another form of general taxation.
The scope of liability was not addressed in any specific terms to
predict the Commission's outcome on lender liability. The Commission
raised the question of whether the channeling of liability should be to the
party "with the technical know-how, resources and operational control of
the activity." 2 Although this language bears a striking resemblance to that
of the Directive which the Commission also considered, the Commission
commented that any such standard of liability would have to consider
219. Id. Thieffry, supra note 19, at 1086.
220. Green Paper, supra note 17, § 3.0. CERCLA currently taxes the oil industry as well
as other high-risk sectors of the economy to support Superfund.
221.

Id.

222. The Economic and Social Committee is comprised of 189 members in various areas
of economic activity such as employers, workers, and interest groups. It is a primarily a
consultant body representing those interests and is consulted on most Community legislation.
EMILE NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER-THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 48
(1993).
223. Economic & Social Committee Opinion on the Communication from the Commission
to the Council, Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: Green Paper on Remedying
Environmental Damage 94 C 133/02, 1994 O.J. (C133) § 4.5.2 [hereinafter ESC Opinion].
224. Id. §§ 4.5.1, 4.5.3.
225.

Green Paper, supra note 17, § 4.1.2(C).
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lenders and financial institutions.2
The ESC raised the issue more
directly, stating in its opinion that insurance companies and banks need to
be safeguarded and "not given inappropriate responsibilities such as prior
risk assessment which do not fall within their traditional sphere of

responsibilities.

"27

The Green Paper has presently receded behind closed doors. Like
the ESC, the European Parliament's legal committee issued an internal
report commenting on the utility of an EU liability regime.
The
environment directorate general (DGXI) awarded two twelve month
research projects to assess the effectiveness of existing liability regimes in
individual countries. In tandem, the DGXI is preparing a series of opinion
papers to be issued this year discussing possible EU civil liability
schemes.- Although France and the United Kingdom continue to show
resistance to any community-wide liability plan, the continued progress of
both the Convention and Green Paper, as well as increased national
legislation, are building momentum. However, given the research projects
by DGXI, it is doubtful any substantive legislation will appear until late in
1995 or early 1996.
IV. CONCLUSION
Lender liability in the United States under CERCLA has proven to
be an unpredictable, if not unworkable framework especially for lenders in
recent years. The liability scheme is based on the notion of strict liability
in order to facilitate compliance and remediation efforts. Concurrently,
the underlying principle of the Act is that those who cause environmental
damage or who have control over activities resulting in environmental
harm should pay for the remediation costs (i.e. the polluter pays principle).
However, application of these fundamental principles to lenders have been
inopposite at times. A European system of civil liability needs to address
this inefficient shortcoming at the outset and develop a scheme which
promotes both harmoniously.
Fleet Factors expanded the polluter pays principle to reach lenders
who have the ability to influence hazardous waste decisions through their
participation in financial management. The EPA's lender liability rules
sought to narrow liability to wholly exclude financial or administrative
management, limiting liability to cases where management of a facility

226. Id.
227. ESC Opinion, supra note 223, § 4.4.3.
228. Chris Clarke, UK: Environmental Issues Special Report-Getting Into Shape, CORP.
COVER, Feb. 28, 1995, at 18.

1995]

Morgan

169

extended to the control or responsibility for day-to-day operations or
environmental compliance. Both represent extremes and do not equitably
spread the risk of environmental liability. The present problems of
insurability and availability of funds for loans has proven that the existing
ambiguous scheme is unworkable and detrimental both to the economy and
the environment. Lenders are demanding burdensome rates for certain
key industries out of fear of incurring environmental liability. More
frequently, lenders are simply refusing to make funds available for
environmental projects,
stifling environmental
compliance
and
remediation. However, the answer is not to divorce lending practices
from liability in such a narrow fashion as to insure secured creditors
against environmental liability losses. Simplifying the calculus to direct
control over operational aspects without consideration of the extensive
influence of financial or administrative management is short sighted and
overkill. The solution lies between the two.
Lenders are in the business of assessing risk and making loans on
that basis. They need to have sufficient freedom to investigate and
supervise a borrower's compliance with environmental laws without
incurring liability themselves. Any liability scheme must provide clear
guidelines for lenders to follow in order to better quantify risk and allocate
costs. Lenders must also be allowed to conduct traditional pre- and postforeclosure activities to protect their security interests so long as their
conduct does not pass a certain threshold of activity. Thus lender liability
should be limited to cases in which a lender exerts actual control over the
day-to-day operations of a facility either through direct operational
management or extensive financial or administrative management. The
inquiry remains fact intensive to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
However, some guidelines on permissible activities, similar to some of
those announced in the EPA rules, need to be clearly spelled out at a
legislative level to increase predictability. Any administrative agency
given enforcement responsibilities should not be given the freedom to also
define the parameters of an individual's liability because this undermines
the judicial process and lends itself to administrative abuse.
The European Union needs to closely consider the relevant
extremes and examine their feasibility as demonstrated in the United
States. The United States experience is a perfect test caso from which the
Member States can learn. Any civil liability scheme should be based on
strict liability to ensure effective remediation and decreased costs. It
appears from the various pieces of liability legislation that the European
nations have endorsed this position. Counter to the ESC's position, the
utility of an environmental fund cannot be underestimated where the
inherent process of litigation delays environmental response time and
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remediation efforts. It is an effective cost-spreading method that makes up
for the shortcomings of environmental civil liability. The need for quick
response time buttressed by efficient cost-spreading outweighs the
concerns about general taxation and reduced personal accountability.
Personal accountability can be achieved through regulatory action and
litigation after remediation efforts have been implemented to address
dangerous environmental hazards. Spreading costs among the various
polluting industries is not a disproportional burden to have to bear to
ensure the protection of the environment and human welfare.
Additionally, the administration of such a fund and the enforcement of
civil liability within the European Union should be supervised by an
expanded European Environmental Agency in conjunction with the
Commission's DGXI division. Such an expanded agency would be able to
ensure compliance and administrate remediation efforts, much like the
EPA, while further promoting environmental harmonization among the
Member States.
In pursuit of more effective enforcement and harmonization of
standards, any EU legislation should be in the form of a regulation, as
opposed to a directive, in order to create direct application of a Europeanwide liability scheme across all Member States. The mandate for this
power is provided for by the environmental provisions of both the Single
European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. At this level, limitations on
lender liability need to be clearly articulated in language that narrows
liability to an operational level to ensure that the polluter pays principle is
balanced with such a strict liability regime. With the added degree of
clarity and specific guidelines, the European Union can avoid the United
States costly and unpredictable experience. Arguably, the heightened
transaction costs created by lender liability will impact business, but
specific guidelines will allow more reliable risk assessment while
promoting environmental compliance.

